Voting on unidimensional issues will produce equilibrium outcomes if voter preferences are single peaked. While the equilibrium outcomes would not necessarily be Pareto optimal, they would be stable. This paper shows that voting on multidimensional issues can produce stable equilibria if the voting occurs in one "super" ideological dimension. However, interest groups that expect to lose the ideological vote have an incentive to disrupt the voting process by arguing that the voting should not be ideological.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number
9612001.
Length: 7 pages Date of creation: 10 Dec 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9612001
Note: Type of Document - Word 7.0; prepared on IBM PC Pentium running Windows95; to print on HP laserjet 4; pages: 7; figures: none Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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