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Tax morale and (de-)centralization: An experimental study

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Author Info
Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems)
Vittoria Levati (Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems)
Rupert Saugruber (University of Innsbruck)

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Abstract

We consider an economy composed of two regions. Each of them provides a public good whose benefits reach beyond local boundaries. In case of decentralization, taxes collected by members of a region are spent only on that region's public good. In case of centralization, tax receipts from the two regions are pooled and used to finance both public goods according to the population size of each region. The experiment shows that centralization induces lower tax morale and less efficient outcomes. The reasons are that centralization gives rise to an interregional incentive problem and creates inequalities in income between regions.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0511014.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 17 Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0511014

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 34
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Tax morale; Fiscal federalism; Public goods experiments;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Benno Torgler & Jan Werner, 2005. "Fiscal Autonomy and Tax Morale: Evidence from Germany," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-07, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
  3. Torgler, Benno, 2002. " Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(5), pages 657-83, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Palfrey, Thomas R & Prisbrey, Jeffrey E, 1997. "Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 829-46, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Lars Feld & Bruno Frey, 2000. "Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Claudia Keser & Frans A.A.M. van Winden, 2000. "Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-011/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2007. "Social identity and trust - An experimental investigation," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-41, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp287, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Traxler, Christian, 2006. "Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers," Discussion Papers in Economics 1202, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Werner Güth & Matteo Ploner & Vittoria Levati, . "The Effect of Group Identity in an Investment Game," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2007. "Tax Evasion, Tax Amnesties and the Psychological Tax Contract," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0729, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
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