Spain is the only large European country in which airport management is strictly centralized and publicly owned. This peculiar institutional setting prevents competition among Spanish airports, and policy makers and bureaucrats in charge of the system regularly justify it on grounds of interterritorial solidarity. This paper tests whether allocation of investments in airports is effectively based on redistributive purposes, as claimed and looks at other factors to explain such allocation. Our empirical analysis suggests that neither a progressive redistribution target nor the scale economies criterion explain allocation decisions. Instead, we find that political factors have significant influence on the allocation decisions made by the government.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number
0511012.
Find related papers by JEL classification: L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data
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