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Agenda Networks and Farsightedly Stable Agenda Formation

Author

Listed:
  • Sami Dakhlia

    (University of Alabama)

  • Frank H. Page Jr.

    (University of Alabama)

Abstract

We model the agenda formation process as a network. In an agenda network, nodes represent agendas while arcs represent coalition preferences over agendas and coalitional moves from one agenda to another. We show that all agenda networks have agenda nodes which are farsightedly consistent. These nodes represent agendas which are likely to emerge and persist if agents behave farsightedly in forming agendas. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by computing the farsightedly consistent agendas for three examples of agenda networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Sami Dakhlia & Frank H. Page Jr., 2005. "Agenda Networks and Farsightedly Stable Agenda Formation," Public Economics 0505003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0505003
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 12
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0505/0505003.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    directed networks; farsighted stability;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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