Interest Groups: An Introduction
AbstractThis paper reviews public choice theories of interest groups.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0209006.
Date of creation: 23 Sep 2002
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Interest groups; rent-seeking;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H - Public Economics
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