Improper Selection of High-Cost Producers in the Rent-Seeking Contest
AbstractThe resources two rival businesses spend to raise their own chance of getting a unique monopoly license are a cost of rent-seeking. When those businesses differ in the costs of producing the monopoly good there is an additional cost of rent-seeking that has not been studied in the literature. If the high cost producer wins the license, the difference between his cost and the costs of his more efficient rival is a social loss from improper selection of producers by the political process. The loss becomes more severe when the ability to lobby of the inefficient producer outstrips that of the efficient producer. This may help to explain why specialized lobbying evolved. Specialized lobbying reduces the social cost from improper selection of firms by allowing efficient producers to hire expert rent-seekers and so to raise their chances of gaining monopoly concessions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0112001.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 07 Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 16; figures: included/request from author/draw your own. PDF file may be viewed or printed
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Rent-seeking; political efficiency; deadweight loss;
Other versions of this item:
- Palda, Filip, 2000. " Improper Selection of High-Cost Producers in the Rent-Seeking Contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 291-301, December.
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-12-14 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Filip Palda, 1998. "Evasive Ability and the Efficiency Cost of the Underground Economy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(5), pages 1118-1138, November.
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