We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in the latter they are. We provide necessary conditions that increasing equilibria of contribution games and subscription games must satisfy for general distribution functions. We then characterize a symmetric equilibrium of the subscription game when valuations are uniformly distributed. Our analysis shows that there is a significant difference between the equilibrium outcomes of the two games. In fact, we show that for the contribution game, ``contributing zero'' is the only equilibrium for a general family of distributions.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number
9901004.
Length: 19 pages Date of creation: 21 Jan 1999 Date of revision:
06 Jul 1999 Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9901004
Note: Type of Document - Postscript file; prepared on IBM PC - PC- TEX; to print on HP; pages: 19 Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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