Discrete Public goods with incomplete information
AbstractWe analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in the latter they are. We provide necessary conditions that increasing equilibria of contribution games and subscription games must satisfy for general distribution functions. We then characterize a symmetric equilibrium of the subscription game when valuations are uniformly distributed. Our analysis shows that there is a significant difference between the equilibrium outcomes of the two games. In fact, we show that for the contribution game, ``contributing zero'' is the only equilibrium for a general family of distributions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 9901004.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 21 Jan 1999
Date of revision: 06 Jul 1999
Note: Type of Document - Postscript file; prepared on IBM PC - PC- TEX; to print on HP; pages: 19
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public goods; incomplete information;
Other versions of this item:
- Menezes, F.M. & Monteiro, P.K. & Temini, A., 1998. "Discrete Public Goods With Incomplete Information," Papers 348, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
- Flavio M. Menezes & Paulo K. Monteiro & Akram Temimi, 1998. "Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 98-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Temimi, Akram & Menezes, Flavio Marques, 1999. "Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 359, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
- D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
- D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
- H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-02-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-1999-02-15 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-1999-02-15 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-1999-02-15 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
- Klemperer, Paul, 2000.
"Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, EconWPA.
- Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W25, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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