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Un modelo de decisión judicial previsional argentino

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  • Carlos Salomón

    (Universidad de San Andrés)

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    Abstract

    Following the separation of powers' models, this paper analyzes the behaviour of the Supreme Court in the Social Security's case Rolon Zappa (1986). Besides judicial independence, I suppose that the economic, social and legal conditions of the case influence the utility of the judges. I develop a game between five players: the Supreme Court, the Social Security Administration, the pensioner, the Executive and the Congress. As a result, the Court, at least in this particular case, acted strategically; had a long run horizont and did not take into account the macroeconomic and social context of that period.

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    File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/mic/papers/0511/0511001.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0511001.

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    Length: 30 pages
    Date of creation: 05 Nov 2005
    Date of revision: 02 Apr 2006
    Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0511001

    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30. Es un juego entre cuatro
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    Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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    Keywords: judicial game; separation of powers models; supreme court behaviour;

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