Speculation in First-Price Auctions with Resale

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Speculation in First-Price Auctions with Resale

Author Info

Thomas Troger (University of California Santa Barbara)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Thomas Troger

Abstract

We analyze first-price auctions with two asymmetric bidders, where the winner can offer the good for resale to the loser. One bidder has a private value for the good, the other bidder - the speculator - has zero value. We show that, independently of the resale market rules, the speculator's expected profit equals zero. Nevertheless, the opportunity for resale can create a role for an active speculator, destroy the efficiency of the auction, and increase the initial seller's expected revenue.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0308001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 04 Aug 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0308001

Note: Type of Document -
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

repec:att:wimass:19199933 is not listed on IDEAS
Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rod Garratt & Thomas Troger, 2003. "Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp4-03, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Rod Garratt & Thomas Troger, 2003. "Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale," Game Theory and Information 0305003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Rod Garratt & Thomas Troger, 2003. "Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000246, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Haile, Philip A., 2003. "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 72-110, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gupta, Madhurima & Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First price auctions with resale," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 181-185, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Rod Garratt & Thomas Troger, 2004. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Microeconomics 0405005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Rod Garrat & Thomas Tröger, 2005. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse10_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
- Rod Garratt & Thomas Tröger, 2005. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Discussion Papers 42, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Rod Garratt & Thomas Tröger, 2006. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 753-769, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc also has a blog.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.