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Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy

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  • Daniel Kaufmann

    (The World Bank)

Abstract

In this discussion draft, linking research findings with concrete operational challenges, we review key issues in worldwide governance, and present recent empirical evidence. Focusing on defining and unbundling key governance components, such as rule of law, voice and accountability, corruption control, and state capture, we then provide evidence which suggests a sobering picture: on average, there appears to be scant progress worldwide in recent times in improving rule of law and governance, in controlling corruption, and in improving institutional quality -- although there is clearly variance across countries. Further, recent empirical research points to the private sector as influencing public governance, thereby challenging traditional notions of the functioning of politicians, public policy and the public sector, and on the conventional determinants of the investment climate. We posit that the interplay between the elite’s vested interests and the political dynamics within a country, in turn affecting governance and corruption, has often been under-emphasized in program design. These argue for revisiting conventional approaches to promote institutional reform. In particular, we challenge the notion that passing laws by fiat, creating new public institutions, or embarking on anti-corruption 'campaigns', can be very effective, and question the value of traditional public sector management and conventional legal/judiciary reform approaches for many emerging economies. We argue instead that sharper focus on external accountability is required, focusing on: transparency mechanisms and empirically-based monitoring tools (including e*governance), as well as participatory 'voice' and incentive-driven approaches for prevention. These need to feature more prominently in providing checks and balances on traditional public institutions, in empowering non-traditional stakeholders, and in ameliorating state capture and mitigating the very ‘unequal influence' playing field in many countries. In turn, this necessitates probing deeper into the private-public governance nexus, which inter alia leads to focusing on concrete measures to address the challenges of political contestability, political financing reform, and transparency in parliaments, the judiciary and the executive. Recommendations on governance strategies for the next phase are suggested, including on the role of the international community.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Kaufmann, 2003. "Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy," Macroeconomics 0308007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0308007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Lara Agnoli & J. François Outreville, 2021. "Wine Consumption and Culture: A Cross‐Country Analysis," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(3), pages 1101-1124, September.
    3. Orkoh, Emmanuel & Claassen, Carike & Blaauw, Phillip Frederick, 2017. "Corruption, political stability and illicit financial outflows in Sub-Saharan Africa," MPRA Paper 89044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. J. François Outreville, 2011. "The relationship between insurance growth and economic development - 80 empirical papers for a review of the literature," ICER Working Papers 12-2011, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    5. J. François Outreville, 2013. "The Relationship Between Insurance and Economic Development: 85 Empirical Papers for a Review of the Literature," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 71-122, March.
    6. Resnick, Danielle & Birner, Regina, 2006. "Does good governance contribute to pro-poor growth?: a review of the evidence from cross-country studies," DSGD discussion papers 30, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    7. Benoît Prévost, 2004. "Droits et lutte contre la pauvreté : où en sont les Institutions de Bretton Woods ?," Mondes en développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 128(4), pages 115-124.
    8. World Bank, 2007. "Bangladesh : Strategy for Sustained Growth, Volume 1. Summary Report," World Bank Publications - Reports 7765, The World Bank Group.
    9. Staffan Andersson & Paul M. Heywood, 2009. "The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of Transparency International's Approach to Measuring Corruption," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 57(4), pages 746-767, December.
    10. Denyer Willis, Graham & Mota Prado, Mariana, 2014. "Process and Pattern in Institutional Reforms: A Case Study of the Police Pacifying Units (UPPs) in Brazil," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 232-242.
    11. Jamie M. Sommer, 2020. "Corruption and Health expenditure: A Cross-National Analysis on Infant and Child Mortality," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 32(3), pages 690-717, July.
    12. Vianna, Andre C. & Mollick, Andre V., 2018. "Institutions: Key variable for economic development in Latin America," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 42-58.
    13. Cagé, Julia, 2009. "Growth, Poverty Reduction and Governance in Developing Countries: a Survey," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 0904, CEPREMAP.
    14. Outreville, J. Francois, 2007. "Foreign affiliates of the world largest financial groups: Locations and governance," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 19-31, January.
    15. Anttiroiko, Ari-Veikko, 2014. "Good governance in context: Learning from anti-corruption policies of Finland and Singapore," MPRA Paper 67807, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Oct 2015.
    16. J. François Outreville, 2008. "Foreign Affiliates of the Largest Insurance Groups: Location‐Specific Advantages," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 75(2), pages 463-491, June.
    17. Anja Linder & Carlos Santiso, 2003. "Not Everything that Counts Can be Counted: A Critical Look at Risk Ratings and Governance Indicators," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 29, pages 105-132.
    18. Morris Altman, 2008. "How much economic freedom is necessary for economic growth? Theory and evidence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(2), pages 1-20.
    19. Kaarel Kilvits & Alari Purju, 2005. "Structure of Public Governance Institutions and Their Impact on Delocalisation of Labour-Intensive Industries," Working Papers 130, Tallinn School of Economics and Business Administration, Tallinn University of Technology.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    governance; empirical analysis; corruption; rule of law; accountability; state capture; public policy; public sector management; transparency; indicators;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • P0 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General
    • P5 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems

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