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Partisanship and fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union

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Author Info
Nicola Acocella (University of Rome La Sapîenza)
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (University of Antwerp & University of Rome La Sapienza)

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Abstract

The recent economic literature shows a new interest in the links between politics and economics. In this paper, we join Hibbs’ partisanship theory with the literature of fiscal policies international co- ordination. Furthermore, by considering a monetary union context, we also open a new angle of view in the recent debate on the effects of the European Monetary Union. In fact, by considering the possibility of governments’ partisan behaviour, we analyse the possibility for governments of internalising macroeconomic spillovers deriving from public expenditure at a national level and investigate the interactions between fiscal and monetary authorities. This paper also partially answers recent concern for considering multi-player contexts and asymmetries in open economy analyses. Here, in fact, several kinds of co-operation and the effects of asymmetries in players' preferences are studied (e.g. the asymmetries in the governments’ preference due to their partisanship).

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Macroeconomics with number 0106003.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 15 Jun 2001
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0106003

Note: Type of Document - PDF; pages: 11
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Related research
Keywords: partisanship; monetary union; international cooperation; policy games;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
E64 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Incomes Policy; Price Policy
F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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  1. Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2001. "Wage And Public Expenditure Setting In A Monetary Union," Working Papers 42, Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Oatley, Thomas, 1999. " Central Bank Independence and Inflation: Corporatism, Partisanship, and Alternative Indices of Central Bank Independence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 399-413, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Dixon, Huw David & Santoni, Michele, 1997. "Fiscal Policy Coordination with Demand Spillovers and Unionised Labour Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 403-17, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Hibbs, Douglas Jr., 1992. "Partisan theory after fifteen years," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 361-373, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Di Bartolomeo G., 2001. "Partisanship, corporatism and macroeconomic performance," Working Papers 2001004, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Acocella, Nicola & Ciccarone, Giuseppe, 1997. " Trade Unions, Nonneutrality and Stagflation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 161-78, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Detken, Carsten & Gartner, Manfred, 1992. " Governments, Trade Unions and the Macroeconomy: An Expository Analysis of the Political Business Cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 37-53, January.
  9. Zervoyianni, Athina, 1997. "Monetary Policy Games and Coalitions in a Two-Country Model with Unionised Wage Setting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 57-76, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1997. "The Rise and Persistence of Rigidities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 290-94, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Blinder, Alan S, 1997. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: What Central Bankers Could Learn from Academics--And Vice Versa," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 3-19, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Svensson, Lars E O, 1987. " International Fiscal Policy Transmission," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 89(3), pages 305-34.
  13. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
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