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Relying on the Information of Interested--and Potentially Dishonest--Parties

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Author Info
Chris William Sanchirico (University of Pennsylvania Law School & Wharton School)

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Abstract

The paper investigates the role of evidence production in the regulation of private behavior via judicial and administrative process. It proposes a model in which the law makes the agent’s “fine” depend on the presentation of evidence whose production cost, in turn,depends on how the agent has behaved in the regulated activity. This view of evidence production has several notable implications, including that truth- finding has no direct role in deterrence, that non-falsifiable evidence, even when available, is unlikely to be the best choice for the system, and that “overdeterrence” may well be cost effective.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/le/papers/0403/0403001.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 0403001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 30 Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0403001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 37. Companion paper: 'Games, Information, and Evidence Production: with Application to English Legal History,' American Law and Economics Review, 2(2), 342 - 380 (2000)
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Evidence production; costly signaling; primary activity approach to evidence; endogenous cost signaling;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H - Public Economics

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," NBER Working Papers 5466, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hadfield, Gillian K, 1994. "Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 159-84, January.
  5. repec:fth:coluec:9603 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1998. "On offense history and the theory of deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 305-324, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Kessler, Daniel & McClellan, Mark, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 353-90, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Hermalin, Benjamin E & Katz, Michael L, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1735-53, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1994. "Accuracy in the Determination of Liability," NBER Working Papers 4203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Steven Shavell, 1989. "Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 183-195, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
  13. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Froeb, Luke M & Kobayashi, Bruce H, 1996. "Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 257-76, April.
  15. Pfaff, Alexander S P & Sanchirico, Chris William, 2000. "Environmental Self-Auditing: Setting the Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correction of Environmental Harm," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 189-208, April.
  16. Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, 1987. "Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 308-315, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Sanchirico, W., 1996. "Enforcement by Hearing how the Civil Law sets Incentives," Discussion Papers 1996_01, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Yeon-Koo Che & Sergei Severinov, 2005. "On the Value of Legal Representation," Discussion Papers 0506-06, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Che, Yeon-Koo & Severinov, Sergei, 2007. "Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure," MPRA Paper 6101, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," Cahiers de recherche 0703, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-29.

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