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Individual Decision-Making to Commit a Crime: Early Models

Author

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  • Roman Horvath

    (Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University + Central European University)

  • Eva Kolomaznikova

    (Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University)

Abstract

The authors provide the summary of the most important findings of the early models of economics of crime, namely the models of Becker, Ehrlich and Heineke. These models study rational individual decision-making about entering into illegal activities. Probability and siže of punishment, attitudes towards risk, gains form crime and income are the main variables which causes the results of the individual behavior. The authors also discuss weaknesses of these models such as its static nature or ignoring interactive decision-making. The relationship to the theory of optimal law enforcement is also presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Roman Horvath & Eva Kolomaznikova, 2002. "Individual Decision-Making to Commit a Crime: Early Models," Law and Economics 0210001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0210001
    Note: Type of Document - Word PC; pages: 18
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Garoupa, Nuno, 2001. "Optimal magnitude and probability of fines," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1765-1771, October.
    2. Eide, Erling & Rubin, Paul H. & Shepherd, Joanna M., 2006. "Economics of Crime," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 205-279, December.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Singh, Balbir, 1973. "Making honesty the best policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 257-263, July.
    5. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    6. Isaac Ehrlich, 1974. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 68-134, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-891, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Maria de Fátima Rocha & Aurora A.C. Teixeira, 2005. "Crime without punishment: An update review of the determinants of cheating among university students," FEP Working Papers 191, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    2. Maria de Fátima Rocha & Aurora A.C. Teixeira, 2005. "College cheating in Portugal: results from a large scale survey," FEP Working Papers 197, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    economics of crime individual decision-making;

    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law

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