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Why do capital intensive companies pay higher wages?

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  • Matti Virén

    (Bank of Finland)

Abstract

An obvious answer to this question is the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis originally proposed by Zwi Griliches (1969). But the relatively poor performance of this hypothesis suggests that other explanations are needed. Here we consider the labour union behaviour in the wage bargaining process as such an alternative. The explanation is based on the observation that capital intensive companies are more vulnerable to strike threats and may thus more easily give in for union wage demand. Thus, the bargaining power of unions is related to the capital-labour ratio. This paper provides some tests for these hypotheses with panel data for Finnish companies. The results give support to the wage bargaining hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Matti Virén, 2005. "Why do capital intensive companies pay higher wages?," Labor and Demography 0508014, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:0508014
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 27. Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 5/2005
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/lab/papers/0508/0508014.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Griliches, Zvi, 1969. "Capital-Skill Complementarity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 51(4), pages 465-468, November.
    5. Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1998. "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 257-273, May.
    6. Graziella Bertocchi, 2003. "Labor Market Institutions, International Capital Mobility, and the Persistence of Underdevelopment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(3), pages 637-650, July.
    7. repec:lsu:lsuwpp:2003-12 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Konings, Jozef & Walsh, Patrick P, 1994. "Evidence of Efficiency Wage Payments in UK Firm Level Panel Data," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(424), pages 542-555, May.
    9. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-460, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. mallick, Jagannath, 2016. "Investigating the Relationship of Disparity in Income, Private investment and wage rate in Indian states: A Panel Cointegration Approach," MPRA Paper 87736, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Aug 2017.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    wages; bargaining; wage distribution; panel data;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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