Contesting Contestability and the Efficiency of Wages
AbstractThe fundamental contribution of the paper is to contest the view that greater market contestability has non-negative effects on market performance. In a model where employees pose a threat of potential entry, we demonstrate that a reduction in barriers to entry causes no fall in industry price when incumbents are able to buy-off potential entry through higher wages. Over the longer term the analysis illustrates that increased market contestability can cause equilibrium industry price to be higher than that which would have occurred if entry barriers had persisted at their initial higher level. Correspondingly, the model indicates that investment in endogenous barriers to entry and wage ceilings on executive salaries may enhance market performance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 9706005.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 21 Jun 1997
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - LaTeX DVI file; prepared on PC-TEX; to print on any; pages: 17 ; figures: none
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Web page: http://22.214.171.124
barriers to entry; market contestability; antitrust regulation; executive salaries;
Other versions of this item:
- Andrew E Burke & Theodore To, 1997. "Contesting Contestability and the Efficiency of Wages," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 9707, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1998-10-02 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Holtz-Eakin, Douglas & Joulfaian, David & Rosen, Harvey S, 1994.
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Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(1), pages 53-75, February.
- Douglas Holtz-Eakin & David Joulfaian & Harvey S. Rosen, 1993. "Sticking it Out: Entrepreneurial Survival and Liquidity Constraints," NBER Working Papers 4494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Black, Jane & de Meza, David & Jeffreys, David, 1996. "House Price, the Supply of Collateral and the Enterprise Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 60-75, January.
- Dasgupta, Partha & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1980. "Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(358), pages 266-93, June.
- Conyon, Martin J., 1994. "Labour's share, market structure and trade unionism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 117-131, March.
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