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Marketing as an entrance barrier into the fashion market

Author

Listed:
  • Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira

    (Faculdade de Economia do Porto)

Abstract

In this paper I intend to model a firm decision of entrance into a profitable fashion market where fashion results from the existence of positive interdependence between buyers utility functions. I conclude theoretically that i) when incumbent firm has an aggressive strategy it sets a marketing limit strategy that do not permit the other firm to enter the fashion market and that ii) when incumbent firm accommodates the other firm a la Cournot there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The properties of the model seem to be in accordance with the persistence in time of fashion brands.

Suggested Citation

  • Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira, 2005. "Marketing as an entrance barrier into the fashion market," Industrial Organization 0501008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0501008
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 8
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/io/papers/0501/0501008.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Granovetter, Mark & Soong, Roland, 1986. "Threshold models of interpersonal effects in consumer demand," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 83-99, March.
    2. Gerard R. Butters, 1977. "Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 465-491.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fashion; Marketing; Utility interdependence; Entrance barrier;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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