This paper is about quality decisions in a vertical structure where competitive producers sell to powerful retailers. Specifically, we focus the analysis on the role played by a tour operator on quality investments when distributing the capacity of a given tourist destination. We emphasize the presence of quality externalities among hotel establishments, and see that sometimes a Tour Operator distribution can provide a solution to the "tragedy of the commons' in quality provision. Thus, we analyze what implications do vertical relations have for quality in this industry, and then derive some policy recommendations
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Length: 25 pages Date of creation: 05 Mar 2003 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0303001
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX/; to print on PostScript; pages: 25 ; figures: none Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003.
"A Primer on Foreclosure,"
IDEI Working Papers
203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005.
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