Quality Externalities among Hotel Establishments: What is the Impact of Tour Operators
AbstractThis paper is about quality decisions in a vertical structure where competitive producers sell to powerful retailers. Specifically, we focus the analysis on the role played by a tour operator on quality investments when distributing the capacity of a given tourist destination. We emphasize the presence of quality externalities among hotel establishments, and see that sometimes a Tour Operator distribution can provide a solution to the "tragedy of the commons' in quality provision. Thus, we analyze what implications do vertical relations have for quality in this industry, and then derive some policy recommendations
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 0303001.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 05 Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX/; to print on PostScript; pages: 25 ; figures: none
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vertical relations; externalities; tragedy of commons; tourism; hotel industry;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L89 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-03-10 (All new papers)
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