State Higher Education Spending and the Tax Revolt
AbstractPublic effort in support of higher education – measured as state funding per thousand dollars of personal income – has declined by thirty percent since the late 1970s. During this time period many states implemented Tax and Expenditure Limits and/or supermajority requirements for tax increases. We use a forty-eight state panel from 1961 to 2001 to evaluate the effect of these tax revolt institutions for state effort on behalf of higher education. These provisions have a statistically significant and economically large impact on the timing and magnitude of this decline in state effort. An understanding of the fiscal environment caused by these provisions is critical for the future of state-supported higher education.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series HEW with number 0412003.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 10 Dec 2004
Date of revision:
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State higher education spending; tax revolt; Tax and Expenditure Limits;
Other versions of this item:
- Robert B. Archibald & David H. Feldman, 2004. "State Higher Education Spending and the Tax Revolt," Working Papers 10, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-12-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2004-12-20 (Education)
- NEP-PBE-2004-12-20 (Public Economics)
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