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The median voter hypothesis, income inequality and income

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Author Info
Branko Milanovic (World Bank)

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Abstract

The median voter hypothesis has been central to an extensive literature on consequences of income distribution. For example, it has been proposed that greater inequality is associated with lower growth, because of the greater redistribution that is sought by the median voter when income distribution is less equal. There have however been no proper tests of the median-voter hypothesis concerning redistribution, because of previous absence of data on factor income distribution (that is, incomes before taxes and transfers) across households, and thus on the gains by poorer households from redistribution. The study reported in this paper is based on the required data, with 79 observations drawn from household budget surveys from 24 democracies. The results strongly support the conclusion that countries with greater inequality of factor income redistribute more to the poor. This is so even when we control for the share of the elderly in the population and for pension transfers. The evidence that the median-voter hypothesis adequately describes the collective-choice mechanism is however considerably weaker. Although middle-income groups gain more/or lose less through redistribution in countries where initial (factor) income distribution is more unequal, this regularity is all but lost when, by excluding pensions, we look only at explicit redistributive social transfers from which the middle classes contemporaneously gain little.This leaves us searching for alternative explanations: do middle-classes gain from transfers in the long-run even if not contemporeneously?, or is the median voter hypothesis, based on direct democracy, a proper representation of the the mechanisms of collective-decision making in representative democracy?

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series HEW with number 0305001.

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Date of creation: 09 May 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwphe:0305001

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Related research
Keywords: median voter; income distribution; income inequality;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy

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    Other versions:
  4. Alesina, Alberto & Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 465-90, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 600-621, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Perotti, Roberto, 1992. "Income Distribution, Politics, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 311-16, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1991. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3599, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. repec:fth:coluec:595 is not listed on IDEAS
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  1. Drosdowski, Thomas, 2005. "Democracy Deficits, Inequality and Pollution. A Politico-Economic Analysis," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-323, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rita Asplund, 2004. "A Macroeconomic Perspective on Education and Inequality," Discussion Papers 906, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Holger Strulik, 2004. "A Distributional Theory of Government Growth," Discussion Papers 04-26, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Achim Kemmerling, 2003. "Regional Input on the Social Dimension of Ezoneplus: Belgium, The Netherlands, France, Austria, and Germany," Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers wp13c, Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, revised 01 Mar 2003. [Downloadable!]
  5. Santanu Gupta & Raghbendra Jha, 2006. "Local public goods in a democracy: Theory and evidence from rural India," Departmental Working Papers 2006-07, Australian National University, Economics RSPAS. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Lisa R. Anderson & Jennifer M. Mellor & Jeffrey Milyo, 2003. "Inequality, Group Cohesion, and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 0308, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Branko Milanovic & Mark Gradstein & Yvonne Ying, 2003. "Democracy, Ideology And Income Inequality: An Empirical Analysis," Public Economics 0305002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Rainald Borck, 2005. "Voting, Inequality, and Redistribution," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 503, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Volker Grossmann, 2002. "Income Inequality, Voting Over the Size of Public Consumption, and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Roman Arjona & Maxime Ladaique, 2003. "Mark Pearson Growth, Inequality and Social Protection," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 29(s1), pages 119-140, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Drosdowski, Thomas, 2006. "Does Democratization Benefit the Environment in the Long-Run in the Presence of Inequality?," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-347, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  12. Croci Angelini, Elisabetta & D'Ambrosio, Conchita & Farina, Francesco, 2002. "Do Preferences in EU Member-States Support Fiscal Federalism?," IRISS Working Paper Series 2002-01, IRISS at CEPS/INSTEAD. [Downloadable!]
  13. Robert A.J. Dur & Coen N. Teulings, 2001. "Education and Efficient Redistribution," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-090/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 12 Jun 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Robert A.J. Dur & Coen N. Teulings, 2003. "Are Education Subsidies an Efficient Redistributive Device?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-024/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 19 Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
  15. Lind, Jo Thori, 2003. "Fractionalization and the size of government," Memorandum 21/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Blanco Pérez, Cristina & Ramos, Xavi, 2008. "Polarisation and Health," IZA Discussion Papers 3727, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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