The one object optimal auction and the desirability of exclusion
AbstractIn this paper we investigate the exclusion of types in optimal auctions. We show that multidimensional types exclusion is a general phenomenon.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series GE, Growth, Math methods with number 0112002.
Length: 6 pages
Date of creation: 17 Dec 2001
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Note: Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on PC; pages: 6
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optimal auction; exclusion;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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- Paulo Barelli & Suren Basov & Mauricio Bugarin & Ian King, 2012.
"The Robustness of Exclusion in Multi-dimensional Screening,"
RCER Working Papers
571, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Paulo Barelli & Suren Basov & Mauricio Bugarin & Ian King, 2012. "The Robustness of Exclusion in Multi-dimensional Screening," RCER Working Papers 576, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Paulo Barelli & Suren Basov & Mauricio Bugarin & Ian King, 2010.
"The Inclusiveness of Exclusion,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
1096, The University of Melbourne.
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