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A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions

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Author Info
Paola Manzini (Queen Mary and Westfield College)
Marco Mariotti (University of Exeter)

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Abstract

We study how social norms and individual rationality in the process of coalition formation sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the `tragedy of the clubs'. We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division, and show that, contrary to common wisdom, the tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9808001.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 07 Aug 1998
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9808001

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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Clubs; Coalition Formation; Multiperson Bargaining;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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  1. Clive Fraser & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2006. "Comparing the first-best and second-best provision of a club good: an example," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(4), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ali al-Nowaihi & Clive Fraser, . "Comparing the First-Best and Second-Best Provision of a Club Good: An Example," Discussion Papers in Public Sector Economics 01/8, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. [Downloadable!]
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