A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions
AbstractWe study how social norms and individual rationality in the process of coalition formation sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the `tragedy of the clubs'. We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division, and show that, contrary to common wisdom, the tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9808001.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 07 Aug 1998
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - .pdf and .ps versions available; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 38 ; figures: included
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Clubs; Coalition Formation; Multiperson Bargaining;
Other versions of this item:
- Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2002. " A "Tragedy of the Clubs": Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(1), pages 115-36.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1998-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1998-10-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-1998-10-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-1998-10-02 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-1998-10-02 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-1998-10-02 (Public Finance)
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- Ali al-Nowaihi & Clive Fraser, . "Comparing the First-Best and Second-Best Provision of a Club Good: An Example," Discussion Papers in Public Sector Economics 01/8, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
- Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud A. de Mooij, 2010.
"Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
10-011/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud A. de Mooij, 2010. "Enhanced Coorporation in an asymmetric model of Tax Competition," Working Papers 1002, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
- Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud A. De Mooij, 2010. "Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 2915, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud A. de Mooij, 2010. "Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-011/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2006:i:4:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
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