Value Oriented Equilibria in Repeated Games of Complete Information
AbstractTwo refinements, called value oriented equilibria, of the Nash equilibrium concept are proposed for repeated games of complete information. Value sufficient equilibria make each player's strategic response to the another player's previous actions depend only on the value of those actions to the responding player. In value monotonic equilibria no player punishes another for taking actions which increase the first player's payoff. The use of value oriented equilibria enables the set of outcomes consistent with equilibrium to be reduced. Outcomes which are unilaterally inefficient (i.e., can be Pareto dominated by the unilateral action of one player) are never part of the equilibrium path.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9607003.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 13 Jul 1996
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Note: 15 pages, WordPerfect 5.1 document, no figures.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- SORIN, Sylvain, 1988.
"Repeated games with complete information,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1988022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Sorin, Sylvain, 1992. "Repeated games with complete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 71-107 Elsevier.
- Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, January.
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