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Analyzing Social Network Structures in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal

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Author Info
Mark D. Smucker (Univ. of Wisc.-Madison, Dept. of Computer Sciences)
E. Ann Stanley (Iowa State Univ., Dept. of Mathematics)
Dan Ashlock (Iowa State Univ., Dept. of Mathematics)
Abstract

The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal (IPD/CR) is an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with evolution that allows players to choose and to refuse their game partners. From individual behaviors, behavioral population structures emerge. In this report, we examine one particular IPD/CR environment and document the social network methods used to identify population behaviors found within this complex adaptive system. In contrast to the standard homogeneous population of nice cooperators, we have also found metastable populations of mixed strategies within this environment. In particular, the social networks of interesting populations and their evolution are examined.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9501001.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 17 Jan 1995
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9501001

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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  1. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
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