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Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets

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Author Info
Robert M. Anderson (University of California at Berkeley, anderson@econ.berkeley.edu)
Walter Tockel (University of Bielefeld)
Lin Zhou (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

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Abstract

In a nontransferable utility exchange economy with a continuum of agents, the Mas-Collel bargaining set coincides with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set, as well as a smaller bargaining set due to Zhou, may fail to converge to competitive outcomes in large finite NTU exchange economies.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9403001.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 02 Mar 1994
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9403001

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

Cited by:
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  1. Chiaki Hara, 2004. "Bargaining Set and Anonymous Core without the Monotonicity Assumption," KIER Working Papers 599, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Sun, N. & Trockel, W. & Yang, Z., 2004. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Discussion Paper 93, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Economic theory and game theory 011, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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