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Preferences, Choices, and Satisfaction in a Bargaining Game

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Author Info
Angela Amborino (Università di Torino)
Alessandro Lanteri (Erasmus Institute for Philosophy & Economics – Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Marco Novarese (Centre for Cognitive Economics - Università Amedeo Avogadro)

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Abstract

The first aim of this contribution is to study the role of cheap talk in the determination of a focal point in a bargaining game. A general discussion was therefore conducted before the bargaining, followed by a poll in which players must find a common solution to an abstract bargaining problem. On this issue, our conclusions are negative: no signifcant effect seems to emerge. This is not entirely unexpected; since the common discussion and the voting procedure staged the confrontation of different viewpoints, there has been no unanimous result. On the other hand, we can conclude that knowing individual preferences may help predicting towards which solutions players will converge, at least in a social setting, and understanding their satisfaction. These considerations refer to variables traditionally left out of economic analysis, which focuses instead on the final payoff and not on its relation to preferences or satisfaction, which are deemed non-measurable. On the contrary, this work has shown that consistent data emerge by simply asking players to express preferences and satisfaction. This makes us confident in formulating new hypotheses aiming at uncovering and understanding individual behaviour. Even if our results do not allow drawing strong final conclusions, they point out new possible answers, new ideas and topics for discussion.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0512/0512001.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0512001.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 02 Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0512001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 17
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: bargaining cheap-talk expectations preferences satisfaction cognitive economics

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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