Market Power Assessment and Mitigation in Hydrothermal Systems
AbstractThe objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid- based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power is simulated with a single stage Nash-Cournot equilibrium model. Market power assessment for multiple stages is then carried through a stochastic dynamic programming scheme. The decision in each stage and state is the equilibrium of a multi-agent game. Thereafter, mitigation measures, specially bilateral contracts, are investigated. Case studies with data taken from the Brazilian system are presented and discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0508009.
Length: 6 pages
Date of creation: 30 Aug 2005
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Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 6
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Game theory; Hydroelectric-thermal power generation; Power generation economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-11-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2005-11-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2005-11-09 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2005-11-09 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures,"
Staff General Research Papers
31548, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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- Rangel, Luiz Fernando, 2008. "Competition policy and regulation in hydro-dominated electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1292-1302, April.
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