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Market Power Assessment and Mitigation in Hydrothermal Systems

Author

Listed:
  • Rafael Kelman

    (PSR)

  • Luiz Barroso

    (PSR)

  • Mario Pereira

    (PSR)

Abstract

The objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid- based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power is simulated with a single stage Nash-Cournot equilibrium model. Market power assessment for multiple stages is then carried through a stochastic dynamic programming scheme. The decision in each stage and state is the equilibrium of a multi-agent game. Thereafter, mitigation measures, specially bilateral contracts, are investigated. Case studies with data taken from the Brazilian system are presented and discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Rafael Kelman & Luiz Barroso & Mario Pereira, 2005. "Market Power Assessment and Mitigation in Hydrothermal Systems," Game Theory and Information 0508009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0508009
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 6
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0508/0508009.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell & Christopher R. Knittel, 1999. "Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 65-88.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schwarz, Hannes & Bertsch, Valentin & Fichtner, Wolf, 2015. "Two-stage stochastic, large-scale optimization of a decentralized energy system - a residential quarter as case study," Working Paper Series in Production and Energy 10, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Industrial Production (IIP).
    2. Alfredo Garcia & Enrique Campos-Nañez & James Reitzes, 2005. "Dynamic Pricing and Learning in Electricity Markets," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 53(2), pages 231-241, April.
    3. Hugh Rudnick & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2002. "Second Generation Electricity Reforms in Latin America and the California Paradigm," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 159-172, June.
    4. Liu, Shuangquan & Yang, Qiang & Cai, Huaxiang & Yan, Minghui & Zhang, Maolin & Wu, Dianning & Xie, Mengfei, 2019. "Market reform of Yunnan electricity in southwestern China: Practice, challenges and implications," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1-1.
    5. Moita, Rodrigo Menon & Monte, Daniel, 2020. "Hydroeletric Generators Competing in Cascades," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 74(1), March.
    6. Fanzeres, Bruno & Ahmed, Shabbir & Street, Alexandre, 2019. "Robust strategic bidding in auction-based markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 272(3), pages 1158-1172.
    7. Ventosa, Mariano & Baillo, Alvaro & Ramos, Andres & Rivier, Michel, 2005. "Electricity market modeling trends," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(7), pages 897-913, May.
    8. Guido Tapia Carpio, Lucio & Olimpio Pereira, Amaro Jr, 2006. "Independent operation by subsystems: Strategic behavior for the Brazilian electricity sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(17), pages 2964-2976, November.
    9. Rangel, Luiz Fernando, 2008. "Competition policy and regulation in hydro-dominated electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1292-1302, April.
    10. Victor Moutinho & Ant nio Carrizo Moreira & Jorge H. Mota, 2015. "Measuring the Simultaneous Quantity Game in OMEL Spot Electricity Market," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 5(1), pages 305-320.
    11. Komain Jiranyakul, 2015. "Oil Price Volatility and Real Effective Exchange Rate: The Case of Thailand," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 5(2), pages 574-579.
    12. Chuntian Cheng & Fu Chen & Gang Li & Qiyu Tu, 2016. "Market Equilibrium and Impact of Market Mechanism Parameters on the Electricity Price in Yunnan’s Electricity Market," Energies, MDPI, vol. 9(6), pages 1-17, June.
    13. Moutinho, Victor & Moreira, António C. & Mota, Jorge, 2014. "Do regulatory mechanisms promote competition and mitigate market power? Evidence from Spanish electricity market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 403-412.
    14. James Bushnell, 2003. "A Mixed Complementarity Model of Hydrothermal Electricity Competition in the Western United States," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 51(1), pages 80-93, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; Hydroelectric-thermal power generation; Power generation economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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