Coalition Strategies and Reduction of GHG Emissions
AbstractThe Flexible Mechanisms articulated in the Kyoto Protocol provide a robust framework for emission reduction issue in a manner that is not just economically efficient, but is also pro-growth for trade. In the presence of liquid or illiquid markets, to attain higher value from the emission trading, we have shown that coalition strategies provide a pertinent alternative to production optimization measures which may not be feasible at times. The whole game is analyzed taking a resource based view of the strategic factor markets. We have also illustrated the measures needed to provide stability to the coalitions and hence the coalition strategies.
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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 19 Jan 2005
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coalition; strategy; game theory; emission; environment; resource based view; strategic factor market;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2005-01-23 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2005-01-23 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2005-01-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-RES-2005-01-23 (Resource Economics)
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