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Riesgo Moral y Contratos: Cierta Evidencia Experimental Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Julián Arévalo (Universidad Externado de Colombia)
Jair Ojeda (Banco de la República)
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This paper shows one type of asymetric information problems, their theorethical implications, the design of contracts that mitigate them, as well as some experimental evidence. Furthermore, by extrapolating the results, the paper tries to illustrate certain macroeconomic implications obtained under a controlled environment.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number
0407002.
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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 08 Jul 2004Date of revision:
18 Jul 2004Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0407002Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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Keywords: Moral Hazard Contracts Experimental Economics Assymetric Information Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Caballero, Ricardo J & Engel, Eduardo M R A & Haltiwanger, John, 1997.
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American Economic Review ,
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Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995.
"Econometrics of First-Price Auctions ,"
Econometrica ,
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Other versions: Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, 2001.
"Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 56-78, February.
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Other versions: Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982.
"An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
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Ochs, Jack & Roth, Alvin E, 1989.
"An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 355-84, June.
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