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Proportional Payoffs in a Model of Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions

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Author Info

  • Maria Montero

    (University of Nottingham)

Abstract

This paper studies coalition formation and payoff division in majority games under the following assumptions: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most natural bargaining protocol, both ex ante and ex post payoff division are proportional to the voting weights. Other bargaining rules may generate counterintuitive comparative statics.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0308/0308001.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0308001.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 13 Aug 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0308001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 24
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: Coalition formation; two-stage bargaining; reversible coalitions; majority games; proportional payoffs;

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