Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers
AbstractWe propose a continuum model for the description of buyer and seller dynamics in an Internet market. The relevant variables are the research effort of buyers and the sellers' reputation building process. We show that, if a commercial website gives consumers the possibility to rate credibly sellers they bargained with, vendors are forced to be more honest. This leads to mutual beneficial symbiosis between buyers and sellers; the overall enhanced volume of transactions contributes ultimately to the website, which facilitates the matchmaking service.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0307001.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 16 Jul 2003
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on linux; to print on PostScript; pages: 19; figures: included. Published on Physica A 316 (2002) 413
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Asymmetric information; Internet commerce; Reputation mechanism;
Other versions of this item:
- Paolo Laureti & Frantisek Slanina & Yi-Kuo Yu & Yi-Cheng Zhang, 2002. "Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers," Papers physics/0207020, arXiv.org.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C39 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Other
- C49 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Other
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-NET-2003-08-17 (Network Economics)
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- Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet & Nadège Marchand, 2008.
"Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence,"
UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- Gabuthy, Yannick & Jacquemet, Nicolas & Marchand, Nadège, 2008. "Does resorting to online dispute resolution promote agreements? Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 259-282, February.
- Yannick Gabuthy & Nadège Marchand, 2003. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00178587, HAL.
- Yannick Gabuthy & Nadège Marchand, 2004. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0401, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- Yannick Gabuthy & Nadège Marchand, 2004. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence," Experimental 0402002, EconWPA.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00259453 is not listed on IDEAS
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