Learning Strategies

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Learning Strategies

Author Info

Nobuyuki Hanaki (Columbia University)
Rajiv Sethi (Barnard College, Columbia University)
Ido Erev (Technion)
Alexander Peterhansl (Columbia University)

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Abstract

Adaptive learning models that have been tested against experimental data typically share two features: (i) initial attractions (or beliefs) are given exogenously, and (ii) learning is based on the performance of stage-game actions rather than repeated game strategies. We develop a model of learning which endogenizes initial attractions and allows for the learning of repeated game strategies. Learning occurs in two phases. In an initial long-run `pre-experimental' phase, we allow players to explore a complete set of repeated game strategies that satisfy a complexity constraint. The limiting attractions from the first phase are then used as initial attractions in the second, short-run phase, which can be tested against experimental data. We find that, relative to existing adaptive models, we are better able to account for the behavior of subjects in environments where fairness and reciprocity appear to play a significant role.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0211004.

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Date of creation: 09 Nov 2002
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0211004

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Article
- Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Sethi, Rajiv & Erev, Ido & Peterhansl, Alexander, 2005. "Learning strategies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 523-542, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2002-11-18 (All new papers)
NEP-CBE-2002-11-18 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
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Other versions:
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Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2005. "Individual and Social Learning," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 31-50, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2007. "Individual and Social Learning," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 421-421, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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