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On the NP-Completeness of Finding an Optimal Strategy in Games with Common Payoffs

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Author Info

  • Francis C. Chu

    (Cornell University)

  • Joseph Y. Halpern

    (Cornell University)

Abstract

Given a finite game with common payoffs (i.e. the players have completely common interests), we show that the problem of determining whether there exists a joint strategy where each player nets at least k is NP-complete.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0004/0004011.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0004011.

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Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: 22 Nov 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004011

Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on Unix; pages: 7; figures: included
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: common payoff games; NP-completeness;

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Cited by:
  1. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  2. Demuynck, Thomas, 2011. "The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 425-433.
  3. Tim Roughgarden, 2010. "Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 193-236, January.

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