Why Companies Go Private in Emerging Markets? Evidence from Poland
AbstractIn recent years the number of going private transactions has sharply increased in emerging markets. The purpose of this study is to establish the financial characteristics of companies that have gone private using a dataset comprising of Polish companies. We use a probit model to distinguish the difference between firms that went private and companies that did not. We find that the probability of going private grew with a rise in the concentration of foreign ownership, an increase in the relative level of free cash flows, a decrease in the level of long term debt, and a decrease in the liquidity of share trading. The results obtained are important both for investors wishing to identify entities characterized by a high likelihood of going private and for governmental authorities evaluating the methods and rationality of privatization mature state- owned enterprises.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Finance with number 0511013.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 25 Nov 2005
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Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30
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Going Private; free cash flow; information asymmetry; ownership structure; emerging markets;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-FIN-2005-12-09 (Finance)
- NEP-TRA-2005-12-09 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- repec:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/7707 is not listed on IDEAS
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