Cutting the Dividends Tax…and Corporate Governance Too?
AbstractEconomists tend to agree that the recent cutting of dividends taxes will encourage investment and reduce financial distress. In addition to creating these “benefits,” however, the tax cut can also increase governance costs. For example, by removing a bias for leveraged capital structures, the tax cut foregoes debt’s superiority on at least three dimensions: 1. Evaluating and monitoring demanders of financial capital; 2. Constraining managerial agents’ from opportunistically employing capital market proceeds; and 3. Encouraging non-financial stakeholders (e.g., employees, suppliers) to make firm-specific investments. Moreover, because these privately produced services contribute to the integrity of broader financial markets (i.e., a public good), competitive forces may not fully counter the tax cut’s governance consequences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Finance with number 0311008.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 19 Nov 2003
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Dividends Tax; Corporate Governance;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-11-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2003-11-23 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-PBE-2003-11-23 (Public Economics)
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