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Testing for Team Spirit - An Experimental Study Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Rupert Sausgruber (University of Innsbruck)
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It is often suggested that team spirit counteracts free-riding. Testing for team spirit with field data is difficult, however, due to an inherent identification problem. In this paper test for team spirit experimentally. In a team work task we vary subjects' information about relative team performance while we leave unchanged the structure of explicit incentives. We find that subjects contribute more to their team's project when teams observe each others' performance. We attribute this result to the enhancement of team spirit caused by asymmetric peer effects between observing teams.
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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 02 Aug 2005Date of revision:
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Keywords: team spirit peer effects organization of work public goods experiments Find related papers by JEL classification: C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
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Uschi Backes-Gellner & Arndt Werner & Alwine Mohnen, 2004.
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