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The Evolution Of Efficient Markets In History

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  • Douglass C. North

    (Washington University)

Abstract

I take my text from Max Hartwell: "...but no historian has detailed the steps by which for example, the market economy was achieved in terms of government action or changing law; no historian has linked mercantilist with laissez-faire law to trace the chronology of legal and economic change. In this neglect, surely a major element for understanding of the industrial revolution has been overlooked." And Max might have added that in consequence of our failure to analyze how a market economy was achieved in history we have not been able to provide guidance for policy makers in the present world who are attempting to restructure failed centrally planned economies. A first step in meeting Max's challenge is to delineate the institutional characteristics of market economies in order that we may then explore their historical evolution.

Suggested Citation

  • Douglass C. North, 1994. "The Evolution Of Efficient Markets In History," Economic History 9411005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpeh:9411005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast*, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
    2. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    3. Watts, Ross L & Zimmerman, Jerold L, 1983. "Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(3), pages 613-633, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Mann & Henry Wüstemann, 2010. "Efficiency and utility: an evolutionary perspective," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 37(9), pages 676-685, August.
    2. Helge Peukert, 2001. "Bridging Old and New Institutional Economics: Gustav Schmoller and Douglass C. North, Seen with Oldinstitutionalists' Eyes," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 91-130, March.

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