Competitive disadvantage through non-existing software patents
AbstractIn a model of sequential patent races, it is examined whether or not introducing a patent law in the home country is beneficial to the firms and the society as a whole given the foreign country already offers patent protection. Before the first patent race starts, the firms and the foreign country share interests. For a given total number of firms, the welfare effect depends on the relative competition profit. For medium values of the latter, the foreign country as well as the firms gain and the home country loses by introducing the patent law. In a Cournot and a Bertand model with a homogeneous product, the home country will never benefit from the introduction of patent protection.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Development and Comp Systems with number 0402006.
Date of creation: 18 Feb 2004
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Sequential patent races; patent law; competition policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property Rights
- L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
- O38 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-02-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-02-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2004-02-23 (Innovation)
- NEP-TID-2004-02-23 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert M. Hunt, 1999. "Nonobviousness and the incentive to innovate: an economic analysis of intellectual property reform," Working Papers 99-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, 2004.
"An empirical look at software patents,"
03-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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