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Battlefields and Marketplaces

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Author Info
Halvor Mehlum (University of Oslo)
Karl Moene (University of Oslo)

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Abstract

Divided societies in the developing world experience wasteful struggles for power. We study the relationship between political stability and resources wasted in the struggle within a model of competitive power contests. The model of power contests is similar in structure to models describing oligopolistic market competition. This analogy helps us in deriving results that are new to the conflict literature. We show, for example, that the Herfindahl-Hirschman index can be interpreted as a measure of power concentration and that a peace treaty between fighting groups have a parallel in tacit collusion between firms in a market.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/dev/papers/0210/0210001.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Development and Comp Systems with number 0210001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 08 Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0210001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on latex; pages: 14
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Violent conflicts Rent-seeking games Herfindahl-Hirschman index Oligopolistic competition.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

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  1. Cowling, Keith & Waterson, Michael, 1976. "Price-Cost Margins and Market Structure," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(171), pages 267-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Moene, K.O., 1992. "Contested Power," Memorandum 19/1992, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  6. Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley, 2001. "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 869-896, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jack Hirshleifer, 1995. "Theorizing About Conflict," UCLA Economics Working Papers 727, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Tangerås, Thomas P. & Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2002. "Ethnic Diversity and Civil War," Working Paper Series 589, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Tsuyoshi Adachi & Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2008. "A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Unequal Societies," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(2), pages 1-11. [Downloadable!]
  2. Caruso, Raul, 2007. "Conflict and Conflict Managment with Asymmetric Stakes (The Bad-Cop and the Good Cop part II)," MPRA Paper 1438, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "Succession Rules and Leadership Rents," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Silje Aslaksen & Ragnar Torvik, 2005. "A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states," Working Paper Series 5805, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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