This paper presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural non-point-source pollution. The analysis is based on a nested agent framework with three parties; farmers, a country's government, and the governments of all countries that affect each other's environmental quality. Unlike previous analysis of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest non-individual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority as a solution to the domestic pollution problem. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. To solve the international problem of pollution management of a common (water) resource, we propose an international agency with authority to write and enforce contracts in each of its member countries. We show that the information requirement on a country's government can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made non-individual.
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Paper provided by University of Wisconsin Madison, AAE in its series Staff Papers with number
392.
Length: Date of creation: Mar 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:wop:wiaesp:392
Contact details of provider: Postal: University of Wisconsin, Dept. of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 427 Lorch Street, Madison, WI 53706 Phone: 608-262-8966 Fax: 608-262-4376 Email: Web page: http://www.aae.wisc.edu/ More information through EDIRC
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