I Can't Think With All This Noise: Inferring Strategies Using Symbolic Regression
AbstractWe use symbolic regression (implemented by a genetic program) to analyze the role of agent expectation formation in games. In the model, agents attempt to infer the strategies of opponents through regression and then best respond using this information. Though agents use deterministic strategies, behavior that resembles a mixed strategy emerges. When one agent uses more complicated strategy primitives (building blocks) significant performance advantages are realized. However, even small amounts of noise in the system can eliminate this advantage. By changing the design of the game we show that it is crucial to accurately infer past actions in order to realize performance advantages from complexity.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Santa Fe Institute in its series Working Papers with number 99-08-057.
Date of creation: Aug 1999
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Genetic program; symbolic regression;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-09-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-1999-10-04 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-EVO-1999-09-21 (Evolutionary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John Duffy & Jim Warnick, 1999. "Using Symbolic Regression to Infer Strategies from Experimental Data," Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 1033, Society for Computational Economics.
- Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-81, November.
- Miller, John H., 1996. "The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 87-112, January.
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