Inequality and Redistribution in Multiple Dimensions
AbstractA three-class game of redistribution without a pure strategy equilibrium is studied under a model of adaptive politicians. This model allows us to integrate one person - one vote models of redistribution with the models which emphasize political influence so as to study when different social classes will form coalitions against each other and what types of redistributive policies are likely to emerge from that interaction. For a wide range of parameter specifications, we find that inequality is negatively related to redistribution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Santa Fe Institute in its series Research in Economics with number 98-06-054e.
Date of creation: Jun 1998
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-01-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-1999-01-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-1999-01-18 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PUB-1999-01-18 (Public Finance)
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