Inefficient delays in trades can sometimes be observed after the arrival of important public news. This paper explains these phenomena with a model in which agents defer trades in the fear that they may be taken advantaged of by better informed trading partners. Under certain conditions, delay is inevitable, yet total collapse of trade can be avoided.
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Paper provided by Santa Fe Institute in its series Research in Economics with number
97-06-057e.
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