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Dynamic Risk Taking With Indivisible Risks

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  • Gollier, Christian

Abstract

In this paper, we examine second-best efficient allocations of risk when some forms of incompleteness are introduced in risk- sharing contracts. In the first model, there are two independent sources of risk, but risk-sharing contracts can be made contingent to only one of the two sources. We examine the condition under which those who bear the non-transferable risk should bear relatively less of the transferable risk in the economy. Decreasing absolute prudence, i.e. -u'''/u'')'

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Risk and Insurance Archive in its series Working Papers with number 013.

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Date of creation: May 1994
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Handle: RePEc:wop:riskar:013

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Related research

Keywords: risk sharing; background risk; decreasing prudence.;

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  1. Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January.
  2. DREZE, Jacques & GOLLIER, Christian, . "Risk sharing on the labour market and second-best wage rigidities," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1073, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Miles S. Kimball, 1991. "Standard Risk Aversion," NBER Technical Working Papers 0099, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Meade, James E, 1972. "The Theory of Labour-Managed Firms and of Profit Sharing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 82(325), pages 402-28, Supplemen.
  5. Eeckhoudt, Louis & Gollier, Christian & Levasseur, Michel, 1993. " The Economics of Adding and Subdividing Independent Risks: Some Comparative Statics Results," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 325-37, December.
  6. Gollier, Christian & John W. PRATT, 1993. "Weak Proper Risk Aversion And The Tempering Effect of Background Risk," Working Papers 018, Risk and Insurance Archive.
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