Rational Inefficient Compromises in Negotiation
AbstractIt has often been assumed that rational negotiators who achieve inefficient compromises should accept Pareto improvements suggested by some external party, such as an expert mediator, or a computer system. Following this assumption an argument is made to give legitimacy to efficient compromises generated by a negotiation support system or to entice a partymove to a Pareto improvement. The simplificatons made in model construction on the one hand and the very narrow and limited considerations of rationality in present negotiation support systems on the other, suggest a different approach to support. This approach is based on engaging users to a sound process confronting them with their inconsisencies rather than providing solutions or promoting improvements.
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Date of creation: May 1998
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