Equal Pay for all Prisoners/ The Logic of Contrition
AbstractThis report deals with two questions concerning the emergence of cooperative strategies in repeated games. The first part is concerned with the Perfect Folk Theorem and presents a vast class of equilibrium solutions based on Markovian strategies. Simple strategies, called equalizers, are introduced and discussed: if players adopt such strategies, the same payoff results for every opponent. The second part analyzes strategies implemented by finite automata. Such strategies are relevant in an evolutionary context; an important instance is called Contrite Tit For Tat. In populations of players adopting such strategies, Contrite Tit For Tat survives very well- at least as long as errors are restricted to mistakes in implementation ('the trembling hand'). However, this cooperative strategy cannot persist if mistakes in perception are included as well.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in its series Working Papers with number ir97073.
Date of creation: Nov 1997
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90-29, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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