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Equal Pay for all Prisoners/ The Logic of Contrition

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  • M.C. Boerlijst
  • M.A. Nowak
  • K. Sigmund
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    Abstract

    This report deals with two questions concerning the emergence of cooperative strategies in repeated games. The first part is concerned with the Perfect Folk Theorem and presents a vast class of equilibrium solutions based on Markovian strategies. Simple strategies, called equalizers, are introduced and discussed: if players adopt such strategies, the same payoff results for every opponent. The second part analyzes strategies implemented by finite automata. Such strategies are relevant in an evolutionary context; an important instance is called Contrite Tit For Tat. In populations of players adopting such strategies, Contrite Tit For Tat survives very well- at least as long as errors are restricted to mistakes in implementation ('the trembling hand'). However, this cooperative strategy cannot persist if mistakes in perception are included as well.

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    File URL: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents/IR-97-073.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in its series Working Papers with number ir97073.

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    Date of creation: Nov 1997
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    Handle: RePEc:wop:iasawp:ir97073

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    1. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
    2. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    3. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Repeated Games Played By Finite Automata," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 90-29, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    4. D. Fudenberg & E. Maskin, 2010. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 546, David K. Levine.
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