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Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics W. Güth
R. Ivanova-Stenzel
E. Wolfstetter
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Paper provided by Humboldt Universitaet Berlin in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 373 with number
2001-15.
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Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)Sadrieh, A. & Pezanis-Christou, P., 2003.
"Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions ,"
Discussion Paper
58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007.
"An experimental comparison of sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies ,"
Research Memoranda
055, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
Alexander Elbittar, 2003.
"Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price Auctions: A Laboratory Study ,"
Working Papers
0304, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: A. Alexander Elbittar, 2005.
"Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price ,"
Microeconomics
0508008, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Oliver Kirchkamp, & Eva Poen, & Philipp Reiß, 2006.
"Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction ,"
CRIEFF Discussion Papers
0605, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Oliver Kirchkamp & Eva Poen & J. Philipp Reiß, 2008.
"Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction ,"
Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics
2008-022, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek.
[Downloadable!] Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Rei, J. Philipp, 2009.
"Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 153-169, February.
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