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Auctions-An Introduction

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Elmar WOLFSTETTER

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Paper provided by Humboldt Universitaet Berlin in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 373 with number 1994-13.

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Handle: RePEc:wop:humbsf:1994-13

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-90, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Roll, Richard, 1986. "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 197-216, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. S.J. Rassenti & V.L. Smith & R.L. Bulfin, 1982. "A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 402-417, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Henry Goldstein, 1962. "The Friedman Proposal for Auctioning Treasury Bills," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 386. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Douglas Dyer & John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, 1989. "Resolving Uncertainty about the Number of Bidders in Independent Private-Value Auctions: An Experimental Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 268-279, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bagnoli, M. & Bergstrom, T., 1989. "Log-Concave Probability And Its Applications," Papers 89-23, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
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  10. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, Joan G, 1985. "Auction Theory with Private Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 150-55, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1991. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 362-69, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Robert G. Hansen, 1988. "Auctions with Endogenous Quantity," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 44-58, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Riley, John G, 1989. "Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 41-50, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "A Theory of Monopoly Pricing Schemes with Demand Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 347-65, June.
  17. Robert J. Weber, 1981. "Multiple-Object Auctions," Discussion Papers 496, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  18. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Marc S. Robinson, 1985. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 141-145, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. McCabe, Kevin A. & Rassenti, Stephen J. & Smith, Vernon L., 1989. "Designing `smart' computer-assisted markets : An experimental auction for gas networks," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 5(2-3), pages 259-283. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D., 1988. "Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior In First, Second And Third-Price Auctions With Varying Numbers Of Bidders," Papers 13, Houston - Department of Economics.
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  24. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1984. " Theory and Behavior of Multiple Unit Discriminative Auctions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(4), pages 983-1010, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1985. "A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(3), pages 525-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  27. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Urs Meister, 2004. "Franchise Bidding in the Water Industry – Auction Schemes and Investment Incentives," Public Economics 0412011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Gerard J. van den Berg & Jan C. van Ours & Menno P. Pradhan, 2001. "The Declining Price Anomaly in Dutch Dutch Rose Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1055-1062, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. M. Landsberger & J. Rubinstein & E. Wolfstetter & S. Zamir, . "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-36, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
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  4. Alexander Elbittar, 2003. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price Auctions: A Laboratory Study," Working Papers 0304, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2006. "Asymmetric Auctions: Analytic Solutions to the General Uniform Case," Discussion Paper Series dp432, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  6. Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Jakob Rubinstei & Shmuel Zamir, 1997. "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations," Microeconomics 9701004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Hans-Werner Sinn & Alfons Weichenrieder, 1997. "Foreign Direct Investment, Political Resentment and the Privatization Process in Eastern Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Roberto Burguet, 2000. "Auction theory: a guided tour," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(1), pages 3-50, January. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Skully, David W., 1999. "The Economics Of Trq Administration," Working Papers 14584, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium. [Downloadable!]
  10. Michael Beckmann, 2004. "Art Auctions and Bidding Rings: Empirical Evidence from German Auction Data," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 125-141, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Brett Bryan & Jeffery Connor et al, 2005., 2005. "Catchment Care - Developing an Auction Process for Biodiversity and Water Quality Gains. Volume 1 - Report," Natural Resource Management Economics 05_004, Policy and Economic Research Unit, CSIRO Land and Water, Adelaide, Australia. [Downloadable!]
  12. D. K"Ubler, . "Auctioning Off Labor Contracts: Legal Restrictions Reconsidered," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-22, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  13. G. Bellettini & G. Ottaviano, 1999. "Special Interests and Technological change," Working Papers 340, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Wei Lim & Joo Lee-Partridge & Soo Tan, 2008. "Revenue implication of auction value in k-price sealed-bid auctions: An experimental study," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 25-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2006. "Asymmetric Auctions: Analytic Solutions to the General Uniform Case," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000410, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. E. Wolfstetter, . "Third- And Higher- Price Auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-3, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  17. Elmar Wolfstetter & Walter Elberfeld, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Bertrand Competition with Entry," Microeconomics 9701003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. A. Alexander Elbittar, 2005. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price," Microeconomics 0508008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  19. van den Berg, Gerard J, 2005. "On the Uniqueness of Optimal Prices Set by Monopolistic Sellers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5166, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. E. Wolfstetter, . "Regulation of Monopoly," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-37, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  21. D. Nautz & E. Wolfstetter, . "Optimal Bids in Multi-Unit Auctions when Demand is Price Elastic," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-33, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  22. Reiss, J. Philipp & Schöndube Jens Robert, 2007. "First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model," Research Memoranda 003, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  23. E. Wolfstetter, . "A Simple Solution of Some Auction Games," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1995-23, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
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