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When Will an Airline Stand Its Ground? An Analysis of Fare Wars

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  • Leola B. Ross

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  • Leola B. Ross, "undated". "When Will an Airline Stand Its Ground? An Analysis of Fare Wars," Working Papers 9703, East Carolina University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:eacaec:9703
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    File URL: http://www.ecu.edu/econ/wp/97/ecu9703.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    2. Scott,John T., 2005. "Purposive Diversification and Economic Performance," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521022583, January.
    3. Severin Borenstein, 1989. "Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the U.S. Airline Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 344-365, Autumn.
    4. Borenstein, Severin & Rose, Nancy L, 1994. "Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 653-683, August.
    5. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
    6. Hadar, Josef & Russell, William R, 1969. "Rules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 25-34, March.
    7. Kakwani, Nanak, 1989. "On Measuring Undernutrition," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 528-552, July.
    8. Robert H. Porter, 1983. "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 301-314, Autumn.
    9. Slade, Margaret E, 1987. "Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 499-516, June.
    10. Scott, John T, 1982. "Multimarket Contact and Economic Performance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(3), pages 368-375, August.
    11. Kathy J. Hayes & Leola B. Ross, 1996. "Is airline price dispersion the result of careful planning or competitive forces?," Working Papers 9607, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    12. William N. Evans & Ioannis N. Kessides, 1994. "Living by the "Golden Rule": Multimarket Contact in the U. S. Airline Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(2), pages 341-366.
    13. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 37-57, Spring.
    14. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    15. Foster, James E & Shorrocks, Anthony F, 1988. "Poverty Orderings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 173-177, January.
    16. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    17. Scott, John T., 1991. "Multimarket contact among diversified oligopolists," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 225-238, June.
    18. Slade, Margaret E, 1989. "Price Wars in Price-Setting Supergames," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 56(223), pages 295-310, August.
    19. Porter, Robert H, 1985. "On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 415-426, June.
    20. Rubin Saposnik, 1983. "On evaluating income distributions: Rank dominance, the Suppes-Sen grading principle of justice, and Pareto optimality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 329-336, January.
    21. Margaret E. Slade, 1992. "Vancouver's Gasoline-Price Wars: An Empirical Exercise in Uncovering Supergame Strategies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(2), pages 257-276.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcelo Resende & Rodrigo M. Zeidan, 2011. "Tacit Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring in the Canadian Manufacturing Industry: An Empirical Study," CESifo Working Paper Series 3623, CESifo.
    2. Harumi Ito & Darin Lee, 2003. "Incumbent Responses to Lower Cost Entry: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry," Working Papers 2003-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    3. Zhang, Yahua & Round, David K., 2011. "Price wars and price collusion in China's airline markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 361-372, July.
    4. Ma, Wenliang & Wang, Qiang & Yang, Hangjun & Zhang, Yahua, 2019. "An analysis of price competition and price wars in Australia's domestic airline market," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 163-172.
    5. García-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, Ainhoa & Pereira, Pedro & Pernías-Cerrillo, J. Carlos, 2014. "On the evolution of monopoly pricing in Internet-assisted search markets," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(5), pages 795-801.
    6. Ila Alam & Leola Ross & Robin Sickles, 2001. "Time Series Analysis of Strategic Pricing Behavior in the US Airline Industry," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 49-62, July.

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