This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Hard Cores and Soft Cores: Evolving Coalitions, Edgeworth and the Bolzmann Machine&

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Arthur DeVany (Department of Economics and Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, UCI.)
Abstract

This is a study of emergent economic order---order that is the result of human action but not human design. I study a coordination game in which locally connected agents act without deliberation. Their locally optimal actions propagate through neighbors to others, and coalitions form adaptively. I map the game onto a hypercube and develop a connectionist model of it. Simulation results show that the process is self-organizing and evolves to optimal or near-optimal equilibria; the agent network computes the core of the game. Its equilibria are path-dependent and the dynamic may become trapped on local optima; broken symmetry and noise promote evolution to global optima. Primary field (17), self-organization and emergent behavior;

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://cce.sscnet.ucla.edu/papers/devany/hardcore/hardcore.zip
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 500 Can't connect to cce.sscnet.ucla.edu:80 (connect: timeout). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Thomas Krichel)
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of California at Los Angeles, Center for Computable Economics in its series Working Papers with number _018.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wop:callce:_018

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://cce.sscnet.ucla.edu/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Data contributors to RePEc receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-6.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.