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Economic Performance and Leadership Accountability: An Econometric Analysis

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  • Gallego, M.E.

Abstract

Logit models of leadership duration test whether different agents are responsible for constitutional and unconstitutional transfers of power. Lagged values of per capita real investment have a significantly negative impact on unconstitutional transitions. This suggests that the elites of less developed countries determine the timing of unconstitutional transfers as they are the ones with investment capabilities. Lagged values of per capita real consumption are associated with the well-being of an average citizen. However, consumption exerts an unexpected positive influence on constitutional transitions when political regime differences are not taken into account. This significant effect disappears with the inclusion of parliamentary and presidential regime dummies.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 97-7.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wlu:wpaper:97-7

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Keywords: ECONOMIC MODELS ; REGRESSION ANALYSIS;

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Cited by:
  1. Gallego, M. & Pitchik, C., 2004. "An economic theory of leadership turnover," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2361-2382, December.
  2. Joel Guttman & Rafael Reuveny, 2014. "On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 27-52, April.

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